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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the ongoing changes in strategy, structure, and performance of the 
largest 250 non-financial firms in both Britain and Germany.  To this end, publicly available 
firm-level data is presented at first and supplemented by the results of a questionnaire survey 
that was sent to the chief executives of those companies.  What came through from the survey 
was that many firms in both countries are driven by the desire to specialise and 
internationalise and are primarily achieving this via ‘horizontal’ mergers and acquisitions.  
While seeing a definite convergence in certain areas, clear and distinctive differences remain 
between the two countries. 
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 1.  Introduction 
 
The aim of this paper is to explore changes in corporate strategy, structure and performance in the 
largest British and German non-financial firms.  It is structured into two parts.  The first part 
analyses publicly available data on company size and performance.  It focuses on establishing 
structural differences between the largest British and German non-financial firms.  The second 
part outlines the results of a questionnaire survey that was sent to the chief executives of these 
firms.  The survey aims to provide a snapshot of the corporate restructuring efforts, which has 
been taking place in the two countries, including changes in the role of the head office. 
 The subject of analysis are the largest non-financial firms in both countries.  In Britain, all 
firms selected were constituents of the FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 in November 1999, in Germany 
the DAX 100 companies were used.  The remaining German firms were selected as being part of 
the SDAX index, the balance by market capitalisation.  This provided a total of 264 British firms 
and 242 German firms.   
 The theoretical basis of this study is derived from the work on the nature of the firm 
initiated by Coase (1937) and continued by others – in particular Oliver Williamson (1975, 1985, 
and 1986).  These authors showed that changes in the boundaries of the firm could increase its 
efficiency by lowering transaction costs relative to market exchanges.  Recent changes might 
have become necessary through economic or technological developments, or simply because of 
the failures of earlier strategies.  The purpose of corporate restructuring as defined in this study is 
to improve competitiveness and profitability through changes in the boundaries of the firm, its 
internal structure, or both. 
 Chapter 2 of this paper outlines the results of analysing aggregated accounting data on 
structure and performance of the largest firms in Britain and Germany, Chapter 3 shows the 
results of the questionnaire survey while Chapter 4 summarises and concludes.   
 
 
2.  Size and Performance Over Time 
 
This chapter aims to establish changes in the size and performance of the target group over time 
and between the two countries.  To gain a more precise reading, the sample is divided into ‘small’ 
and ‘large’ firms along the lines of the indexes in the respective countries.  Large firms are 
labelled as such if the y form part of the FTSE and DAX 100; they are otherwise labelled as small 
firms. 
 In addition, two different sets of results are reported, one derived from a rebalanced and 
the other from a fixed sample .  The fixed sample includes all firms for which a full set of data 
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was available for the investigation period between 1990 through 19981.  The full, or rebalanced 
sample comprises all firms including those for which only results for part of the period were 
available .  It has to be taken into account that both samples have a distinctly different nature.  For 
example, the full sample includes new upcoming firms from the ‘new economy’ sectors of 
technology, media, and telecoms; the fixed sample has a natural bias towards long established 
firms and multinationals. 
 
Size 
 
One of the key comparisons of size is that of the number of employees.  Table 1 below reports the 
number of employees for both large and small firms.  Figure 1 to the left illustrates the figures for 
a fixed sample, whereas Figure 2 shows the full sample. 
 
 
Table 1:  Average Number of Employees Per Country – Fixed Sample 
 
 
FTSE250 FTSE100 Small: D DAX100
1990 11,212 53,532 2,141 42,223
1991 11,128 53,567 2,316 43,287
1992 11,217 50,085 2,349 45,763
1993 11,034 47,703 2,281 43,592
1994 11,287 45,920 2,250 43,186
1995 11,018 46,615 2,390 44,478
1996 11,580 49,931 2,361 43,605
1997 11,383 51,210 2,168 43,549
1998 11,745 53,118 2,201 43,716
UK Germany
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  Figure 1      Figure 2 
 # of Employees – Fixed Sample # of Employees – Full Sample 
 
 At first sight, large firms (that form part of the FTSE 100 / DAX 100) are of similar 
size in both Britain and Germany with an average of about 45,000 employees.  Looking at the 
two samples separately, quite a different picture emerges.  Whereas the size of the average 
large firm converges for the full sample, a considerable difference remains between large 
British and German firms in the fixed sample.  This provides some evidence that British ‘old 
economy’ firms might be considerably bigger than their German counterparts.  German firms 
also appear to have a very steady employment base, a result that can be expected given the 
less flexible labour market. 
 Interesting differences emerge from the data on smaller firms, i.e. those firms that 
form part of the FTSE 250 in Britain.  Here, British firms are about five times as large in 
terms of employment as their German counterparts.  These results hold for both sets of 
samples, are very robust, and are significant at the 1% level2.  The corresponding data for the 
above figures on the number of employees, together with the data for all other figures 
reported in this chapter, can be found in Appendices 1 to 11. 
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Sales 
 
Another basic measure of size is total sales.  Comparing firm level data for the two countries 
is difficult due to a variety of reasons.  One issue is the establishment of a 'correct' exchange 
rate.  Another important factor is the difference in accounting standards. 
 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is one of the oldest and most relied upon concepts to 
set an alternative exchange rate mechanism to the market exchange rate.  PPP states that in 
the long run the exchange rate is proportional to the two countries’ price levels.  
Nevertheless, there are still considerable differences in calculations of the PPP £/DM (€) 
exchange rate between e.g. the World Bank/IMF and the Bank of England.  Sushil 
Wadhwani3 of the Bank of England suggests a £/€ PPP exchange rate of 1:1.25, which is 
adopted for the purpose of this research.  The following figures and tables report in the 
respective currencies £ and €; the right hand scale of figures, however, is condensed by the 
factor 1.25 to allow for a proportionally correct reading of Euro denominated data. 
 Figure 3 and 4 display the development of net sales for both the large and small firms, 
both for a fixed and full sample.  The actual figures are summaries; the detailed figures can 
be found again in Appendices 1 to 11. 
 
 Figure 3 Figure 4 
Total Average Sales – Fixed Sample Total Average Sales – Full Sample 
 
 The average of total sales for large firms, based on both the fixed as well as the full 
samples, show that large firms in Britain and Germany were relatively equal in size.  The 
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FTSE 100 firms grew at a rate of 4.3% p.a., against 7.4% p.a. for the German peer group 4.  
Here, the higher degree of corporate focus amongst large UK firms (substantiated in Chapter 
3) may be one possible explanation for the differences in turnover growth. 
 The above figures do not reveal, however, that sales of small British firms grew 
relatively faster compared to the group of large firms.  The FTSE 250 firms increased their 
sales by 6.1% p.a., slightly above their German counterparts who managed a 5.3% p.a. 
increase.  The FTSE 250 firms are also much larger than their German peer group; the 
average sales were about 4.5 times that of the German firms in 1998.  This is slightly smaller 
than the employment difference would suggest, indicating that small German firms had a 
slightly higher turnover per employee.   
 
Market value 
 
The market value of British firms is considerably higher than that of the German peer group.  
Figure 5 below depicts the market value of FTSE 100 and DAX 100 companies.  Although 
this measure includes both financial and non-financial firms, it is nevertheless a reasonable 
proxy for the market performance of the non-financial firms.  Non-financial firms are the 
majority of all firms in those indices, and indirectly influence5 the performance of financial 
firms.  In 1990, the market value differential was 2.0 and narrowed over the decade to about 
1.7 in 1998.  It was further reduced to about 1.6 times by 2000.  This indicates that DAX 100 
companies were able to attract new capital and interest over the last decade, and to partly 
close the gap in market value. 
 The picture for smaller firms is different.  Here, the FTSE 250 companies were able to 
double their market value between 1990 and 1998, whereas the market value of small 
German firms stayed at about the same level (see Appendix 3). 
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Figure 5:  Market Value of FTSE & DAX 100 Firms  
 
Sectoral activity 
 
Table 2 depicts the average activity level of each sector for FTSE 100 and DAX 100 firms.  
The sectoral activity is thereby measured as the sum of the share of turnover of all firms 
divided by the overall activity across all sectors6.  The activity of large British and German 
non-financial firms is distributed differently.  The largest German firms are more focused and 
focus primarily on the production of metal goods, engineering, and automobiles7, while large 
British firms distribute their activity more evenly across all the various sectors. 
 The industries in the two countries are most similar in the non-metal manufacturing 
sectors.  The higher levels of privatisation of utilities in Britain can be seen in the relative 
strength of the water & energy sector (SIC 1) and the transport and communication industries 
(SIC 7).  Most striking is the relative importance of financial services, e.g. through the 
provision of credit card services, even for ‘non-financial’ firms in Britain8. 
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Table 2:  Average Economic Activity Within the One-Digit SIC Code of Firms Included 
in the FTSE 100 & DAX 100 
  N 10-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80-89 90-99 
Britain 1994 63 14% 15% 9% 16% 0% 16% 9% 11% 10% 
 1995 63 14% 15% 9% 14% 0% 17% 9% 10% 11% 
 1996 65 16% 13% 9% 13% 0% 18% 9% 11% 10% 
 1997 69 17% 13% 8% 10% 1% 17% 12% 10% 11% 
 1998 72 16% 15% 8% 13% 0% 16% 12% 11% 9% 
            
 Germany 1994 69 4% 18% 39% 12% 5% 9% 2% 2% 9% 
 1995 72 4% 20% 37% 14% 5% 9% 2% 2% 8% 
 1996 73 4% 19% 35% 14% 4% 11% 2% 2% 9% 
 1997 73 3% 21% 38% 13% 4% 9% 2% 2% 8% 
 1998 69 4% 21% 41% 12% 2% 7% 4% 2% 7% 
Source: Own calculations based on company accounts (via Datastream). 
 
Key to SIC-Codes: 
10-19: Energy and water supply industries 
20-29: Extraction of minerals and ores other than fuels; manufacture of metals, mineral products and 
  chemicals  
30-39: Metal goods, engineering and vehicles industries 
40-49: Other manufacturing industries 
50-59: Construction 
60-69: Distribution, hotels and catering; repairs 
70-79: Transport and communication 
80-89: Banking, finance, insurance, business services and leasing 
90-99: Other services 
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Performance measures 
 
In the following, a variety of performance measures will be used to evaluate performance 
changes and identities within and between British and German industry.  Financial 
accounting data and ratios are based on the respective accounting principles of each country, 
UK GAAP and German HGB.  This limits the comparability of the results between the two 
countries, and therefore allows only inferences over time and between large and small firms 
of the same country.  Despite major efforts, it was impossible to uncover research (both 
academic and private), which would give guidelines on how to account for those differences.  
To partly overcome these limitations, the various indicators will also be indexed at 1990 
values.  This provides information on the relative change between the two countries, but does 
not allow a comparison at the absolute level. 
 All reported means are based on a 1% trimmed sample on both ends of the 
distribution.  A 1% threshold was selected to eliminate extreme values that might result from 
measurement errors, exceptional circumstances, or deficiencies in the formulas used.  The 
conventionally used 5% trimmed mean was reduced to just 2% to ensure that superior 
managerial or economic performance was adequately reflected in the sample.  The 
performance ratios are based on data taken from Datastream. 
 
Return on shareholder equity 
 
Return on shareholder equity (ROSE) analyses the return on equity on shares with voting 
rights.  Comparing the two figures 6 and 7 below, the most prominent features are the impact 
of the deep German recession from 1994 to 1996 and the British recession in 1992/1993.  It is 
interesting to see that economic cycles appear to have had much larger impacts on the 
profitability of the large (Top 100) firms than for small and mid-cap firms.   
 Small British firms were able to maintain a very fixed return on shareholder equity 
compared to both larger British firms and their German peer group.  In terms of ROSE levels, 
small British firms earned much higher ROSE with about 12% for the fixed sample, and 
about 10.3% for the full sample.  There is a less clear relationship between the average FTSE 
100 and the DAX 100 firms.  It can be expected, however, that part of the performance 
differences are due to differences in accounting standards. 
 Over the investigation period, large German firms earned a 4% higher return on 
shareholder equity than their smaller rivals.  The corresponding figure for Britain was 4% for 
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the fixed, and 2% for the full sample.  Large firms seem to be more successful in maximising 
shareholder value.  However, no significant correlation can be established between Sales and 
ROSE, nor the number of employees and ROSE. 
 
 Figure 6 Figure 7 
 ROSE – Fixed Sample  ROSE – Full Sample 
 
 
 Figure 8 Figure 9 
ROSE Index – Fixed Sample ROSE Index – Full Sample 
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Return on capital employed 
 
The return on capital employed (ROCE) is depicted in figures 10 and 11 below.  A strong 
disparity in the level of ROCE between British and German firms can be identified.  This 
again might be ascribed to differences in accounting standards.  There is also a substantial 
difference between the return on capital employed for FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 firms.  For 
the fixed sample, large firms returned about 5% more for the same unit of capital between 
1990 and 1998, in the full sample the difference is even higher with 9.1%.  In contrast, there 
appears to be no major difference between large and small German firms.   
 In terms of change (Figures 12 and 13), no clear ‘behavioural pattern’ emerges other 
than that British firms (both large and small) outperformed their German counterparts over 
this eight-year period. 
 
 Figure 10 Figure 11 
 ROCE – Fixed Sample ROCE – Full Sample 
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 Figure 12 Figure 13 
 ROCE Index – Fixed Sample ROCE Index – Full Sample 
 
 
Operating margin 
 
The operating margin, defined as operating profit over total sales, confirms the above finding 
that large British firms appear to outperform their smaller peers consistently over the entire 
eight-year investigation period.  In contrast, large German firms underperformed their smaller 
parts over large parts of the 1990s.  A substantial gap also remains in operating margin 
between German and British firms.  Again, the more conservative German reporting system 
can explain part, but possibly not all, of the difference.   
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 Figure 14 Figure 15 
Operating Margin – Fixed Sample Operating Margin – Full Sample 
 
 
 In respect to changes in operating margin, it is noteworthy that none of the four 
subgroups improved their operating margins considerably over the eight-year period.  After 
being the worst performing group in the early 1990s, the German DAX 100 companies 
showed the relatively best performance by 1998.  For all other subgroups, no clear trend can 
be identified. 
 
 Figure 16 Figure 17 
 Operating Margin Index Operating Margin Index 
 Fixed Sample Full Sample 
 
 
 Various reasons might explain the differences in operating margins and ROCE 
between large and small British companies.  Large British firms seem to operate more 
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efficiently than their smaller peers.  Another possible explanation is that entry and exit into 
and out of the FTSE 100 is more fluid than that of the DAX 100.  This implies a certain self-
selection bias. 
 The above analysis was also repeated for Cash Flow Margins, which revealed very 
similar behavioural patterns to the above outlined results. 
 
Capital employed per employee 
 
The next variable looks at the median values of capital employed, depicted in figures 18 to 21 
below.  Smaller firms are less capital intensive per employee than their larger counterparts, 
and grew their capital base per employee at a slower rate than their larger peers.  
Consequently, the gap in capital intensity between large and small firms increased over the 
last decade.  Comparing the results, it seems that large British firms are more capital 
intensive per employee than large German firms9.  The reverse is the case when comparing 
small firms.   
 In addition, the median value of the capital employed per employee for small British 
firms is fixed for both samples since 1995, and has declined in absolute terms in 1998.  This 
finding is in line with a recent report on the UK economy by Goldman Sachs, an American 
Investment Bank (Broadbent, 2000).  It is also suggested that the growth of capital in relation 
to employment is decelerating.  These findings are supported by this research.  The authors of 
the report attribute the higher labour participation rate for this change in the capital intensity 
of British industry.  The authors are also of the opinion that this might partly explain the 
lower productivity growth rates in Britain over the last few years. 
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 Figure 18 Figure 19 
CE/E (Median) – Fixed Sample CE/E (Median) – Full Sample 
 
 
 
 Figure 20 Figure 21 
CE/E (Median) Index – Fixed Sample  CE/E (Median) Index– Full Sample 
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Effective tax rate 
 
A distinctly different pattern emerges for Britain and Germany in relation to their effective 
tax rates.  The British tax rate remained fixed on a comparatively low level of around 30%.  
The tax rate for German firms declined strongly from about 55% in 1990 to about 40% in 
1998.  It is worth noting that the larger DAX 100 companies had an effective tax advantage 
of about 5% over their smaller counterparts.  Larger German firms appear to have enjoyed a 
‘competitive advantage’ in taxation because of accounting rules that seem to prefer larger 
firms. 
 
 Figure 22 Figure 23 
Effective Tax Rate – Fixed Sample Effective Tax Rate – Full Sample 
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  Figure 24      Figure 25 
 Effective Tax Rate Index – Effective Tax Rate Index –  
 Fixed Sample Full Sample 
 
 
3.  Results of the Questionnaire Survey 
 
The following third chapter outlines the results of the questionnaire survey that was sent to 
the chief executives of 264 British and 242 German firms.  Some of the questions put to them 
were adapted from a similar survey carried out by Ansgar Richter in 1996; about half of the 
questions were asked for the first time.  Where applicable, the results of the last survey are 
reported in conjunction with the results of the new survey. 
 The aim of this survey, which had the sponsorship of the Financial Times and 
Financial Times Deutschland, is to provide a snapshot of corporate restructuring in the two 
countries.  It identifies changes in the degree of diversification; mergers and acquisitions as 
well as demergers and divestments, changes in the head office and in R&D.  The purpose for 
this survey was to overcome the lack of firm level data on ongoing restructuring efforts in 
Europe.  The survey was mailed out in early December 1999, with a reminder in February 
2000.  In total, 52 British firms and 31 German firms replied to the survey.  The resulting 
response rate was 19.7% for Britain and 12.8% for Germany.  Amongst the FTSE 100 
companies, 18 firms replied whereas of the DAX 100 companies 8 firms returned the 
questionnaire. 
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 The response rate was only about two thirds that of a similar survey conducted in 
1996.  Given the similar institutional sponsorship for both surveys 10, other factors were found 
to have influenced this lower response rate.  Compared with the last survey, about double the 
number of firms replied stating that they had a policy of not answering questionnaires.  
Unlike the last survey, some firms replied that the increase in the number of questionnaire 
surveys forced them to introduce such a policy.  Others stated that they have reduced the 
number of staff normally responsible for such matters. 
 One of the intentions of this repeat questionnaire survey was to generate a panel.  By 
matching the panel data on restructuring to that of performance, it was expected to link 
changes in structure to performance (ceteris paribus).  However, the creation of such a panel 
was impossible as only 9 British and 8 German firms participated in both surveys.   
 Another issue faced was the fast changing nature of the composition of the various 
indexes.  This in itself can be an indicator of the changing structure of the corporate sector in 
Britain and Germany.  The analysis revealed that there were 7 new listings in the DAX 100 
between the 01.07.1997 and the 31.12.1998, compared to only 1 of a similar nature in the 
FTSE 10011.  This difference in turn seems to support the notion that some fundamental 
changes are occurring within the German corporate model in the direction of Anglo-
American financing structures.  This can also be an indication that large German companies 
are turning increasingly to the capital market for the ir financing needs. 
 It also should be noted that there were some changes between the method and 
structure of the two surveys.  First, the 1996 research asked questions regarding changes 
spanning as many as 10 years, compared to a five-year period for the recent survey.  The 
results are nevertheless roughly comparable; Ansgar Richter (1997), the author of the last 
survey, noted that many firms who participated in his survey appeared to have had an 
organisational memory of about 5 years or less.  Second, those questions that were adopted 
from the earlier survey were carefully edited.  To summarise, results of the last survey are 
only indicative and cannot be compared perfectly to current results. 
 
Respondent companies 
 
The characteristic of the overall surveyed population was described in the first section of this 
chapter.  However, as the entire population was invited to participate in this research, and 
only a portion of those decided to do so, a certain self-selection bias exists.  This means that 
the body of respondent companies may not necessarily reflect the entire population in a 
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representative way.  Testing was done for differences between the overall population 
identified above and for the firms that took part in the survey.  It was found that there are no 
statistically significant differences between the two groups for each country.  Variables that 
were used in this test12 included the number of employees, total sales and several 
performance indicators such as pre-tax profit and return on capital employed.  This indicates 
that there is no significant bias in the ‘sample’ of respondent companies.   
 
Change in diversification 
 
The first question addresses changes in the degree of diversification within the firm.  In 
general, firms are considered to diversify if they expand their operations beyond their existing 
activities.  In this respect, it is important that the new activities result in new products, which 
operate in different markets and that it might draw on new resources (Cosh, 1987 and Pass et 
al., 1988).  In addition, others also distinguish between product diversification and 
technological diversification (Patel and Pavitt, 1994). 
 Most British and German firms diversified actively through mergers and acquisitions 
in the 1970s and 1980s, whereas others diversified their operation through internal 
development of unrelated lines of business.  Schwalbach (1989, 1990), among others, claims 
that fifteen years ago British companies were in general among the most diversified in the 
world, whilst German companies were either highly specialised or large diversified 
conglomerates.  This view is in part supported by Rondi et al. (1996), which established that 
in 1987, large British firms were, with an average of 5.7 three-digit industries, more 
diversified than large German companies engaged in 4.6 industries.  Richter (1999) 
established that both British and German firms markedly reduced their degree of 
diversification between 1988 and 1994, although German firms to a much lesser extent.  With 
this in mind, it is of great interest to identify any current trends toward conglomeration or de-
conglomeration and the possible convergence of organisational structures in Britain and 
Germany. 
 It was asked: “Did your company change the degree of diversification over the period 
1995 – 1999?” Possible answers ranged from reduced diversification substantially to 
increased diversification substantially (Table 3).   
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Table 3:  Change in the Degree of Diversification 
 
In total, 40% of all British, and 36% of all German firms replied that they had reduced the 
degree of diversification either somewhat or substantially.  These figures contrast with those 
from the 1996 survey when almost 80% of all British and 51% of German firms indicated 
that they had reduced their degree of diversification in the previous five years.  29% of 
British and 32% of German respondents in this current survey stated that they had increased 
their degree of diversification.  Just under a third of all firms in Britain and Germany were 
satisfied with their degree of diversification and had not altered it over the period 1996 to 
1999. 
 In contrast to the earlier period, firms in both countries have shown a very similar 
diversification pattern.  Almost as many firms increased their degree of diversification as 
decreased it, with the remaining ones not changing it.  De-diversification, which was the 
prominent trend in the earlier survey, was replaced by a more balanced approach to 
diversification. 
 To draw any definite conclusions from these results would be premature, as they 
should first be compared and verified with results of other research projects.  At this point in 
time, it is feasible to assume that the economy might have found a diversification 
equilibrium.  With the number of firms reducing and increasing their degree of diversification 
in balance, the overall stock of firms with a constant degree of diversification remains fixed.  
Another possible explanation is that firms follow a more tailor-made, and therefore more 
sensible, approach to diversification.   
 The sample was also divided into smaller and larger firms.  Size was thereby defined 
along the lines of the respective indices.  In respect to diversification, it can be established 
that size does not appear to have any noteworthy influence on the approach of large 
  
  UK D UK D
Count 18 5 38 12
% 34.6% 16.1% 53.5% 29.3%
Count 3 6 18 9
% 5.8% 19.4% 25.4% 22.0%
Count 16 10 5 6
% 30.8% 32.3% 7.0% 14.6%
Count 8 8 8 9
% 15.4% 25.8% 11.3% 22.0%
Count 7 2 2 5
% 13.5% 6.5% 2.8% 12.2%
Count 52 31 71 41
% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
1999 1996
Total number of firms
Reduced substantially
Reduced somewhat
Stayed about the same
Increased somewhat
Increased substantially
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companies (i.e. FTSE 100 and DAX 100 firms) to de-diversification in both countries.  Small 
British firms, however, seem to continue an aggressive drive towards de-diversification.  The 
detailed results for small and large firms are reported in Appendix 12.  It should be 
remembered that the low number of respondents, in particular for large German companies, 
limits the generalisation of the results.   
 To establish not only the changes but also the level of diversification, data on the 
degree of specialisation was collected from published accounts for the years 1994 to 199813.  
The analysis was limited to the level of diversification in the largest non-financial firms listed 
in the FTSE 100 and DAX 100 due to the limited availability of data. 
 
Table 4:  Degree of Diversification Amongst the British and German 
Non-financial Firms Included in the FTSE & DAX 100 
 
 
Year N N-sector 
Specialisation 
Index 
Berry's 
Diversification 
Index 
UK 1994 63 2.11 0.83 0.23 
 1995 63 1.98 0.84 0.22 
 1996 65 2.06 0.83 0.23 
 1997 69 2.06 0.83 0.22 
 1998 72 2.06 0.84 0.22 
      
Germany 1994 69 2.38 0.77 0.30 
 1995 72 2.33 0.80 0.27 
 1996 73 2.30 0.80 0.28 
 1997 73 2.32 0.79 0.29 
 1998 69 2.35 0.79 0.28 
 
 Table 4 denotes the number of firms (N) in the sample for which data was available.  
To evaluate the degree of diversification, three diversification measures were calculated 
(number of sectors (N-Sector), specialisation index and Berry's diversification index).  The 
column “N-Sector” depicts the average number of two-digit SIC-Code level sectors in which 
a firm operates14.  The N-Sector measure of diversification is the simplest as it ignores the 
size and nature (relatedness) of activities.  Due to its simplicity, it is amongst the most 
commonly used (Richter, 1999).  The specialisation index measures the share of a firm’s 
turnover derived from its largest sector.  Although it gives an indication of a firm’s focus, it 
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does not give any indication of the relatedness of its activities15.  The third measure, Berry's 
diversification index D16 (Berry, 1975, p. 62) is an extension to the specialisation index and 
does take into account the activity in less important sectors.   
 Table 4 reveals two characteristics: first, large British firms seem to be more focused 
than German firms.  All three indicators consistently support this finding over the five-year 
period from 1994 to 1998.  Richter (1999) reports, whilst most small German firms are 
relatively specialised, the larger firms are highly diversified.  One would naturally expect the 
diversification index to be higher amongst the largest firms than in the entire population.  The 
literature on diversification in Britain and Germany is somewhat divided about the level and 
changes in diversification.  For large British companies, however, the consensus appears to 
be that since the late 1980s they have reduced their degree of diversification.  In respect to the 
German firms, the literature is less clear-cut, partly because of the influence of ‘bifurcation’.  
(Bifurcation describes that most small German firms are highly specialised, whilst the larger 
firms are highly diversified).  The results of this various studies seem to depend strongly on 
the sample size, and with it on the inclusion of smaller and SME-type firms (ditto).   
 Second, the degree of diversification (of the Top 100 firms) is fixed over this period 
in both countries.  This finding is in line with the results of our questionnaire survey.  As 
outlined above, the number of firms reducing and increasing the degree of diversification is 
roughly equal.  Both effects cancel each other out.  It is possible that a dynamically stable 
situation has been reached in which as many firms diversify than de-diversify.  Taken 
together, there is no fundamental shift in the average degree of diversification in both 
countries17. 
 
Mergers & acquisitions and demergers & divestments 
 
Mergers and acquisitions as well as demergers and divestments are of particular importance 
in the debate on corporate restructuring.  They allow firms to swiftly change their boundaries.  
In both the 1999 and 1996 surveys, the investigated firms were asked if mergers and 
acquisitions or demergers and divestments over the previous 5 years have significantly 
altered their organisation.  The aim of this question is to establish to what degree firms make 
use of M&A as well as demergers and divestments as a ‘tool’ for corporate restructuring.
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Table 5:  Organisational Change Due to Mergers and Acquisitions or 
Demergers and Divestments18 
 
Cross-country comparison:  *** p < 0.1 
 
 In 1999, 86% of all respondents in Britain and 71% in Germany stated that they had 
significantly altered their organisation through mergers and acquisitions.  More than 90% of 
those firms that stated in question 1 (Table 1) that they increased or decreased their degree of 
diversification were involved in M&A activity.  Amongst the firms that did not change the 
degree of diversification, about 60% of British and 40% of German firms were involved with 
mergers and acquisitions.  This indicates that M&A is a very important way of increasing the 
degree of diversification, but also a very important vehicle in restructuring the corporation.   
 Analysing the high levels of M&A activity, one may infer that many firms still prefer 
growth through mergers and acquisitions to organic growth, although this statement is 
somewhat speculative as detailed data on the degree of organic growth is missing.   
 This is as such surprising, as some scholars have pointed out that growth through 
acquisition is typically less profitable than through internal growth.  It appears that 
management values the speed of acquiring additional resources and knowledge more than the 
long-term benefits of building them up internally.  The above data also points to the large 
degree of corporate restructuring activity that is going on in both countries; to some extent 
more so in Britain than in Germany.  It also shows that firms actively use mergers or 
acquisitions to help to achieve their restructuring goals. 
 Many firms were also involved in divesting or demerging parts of their operation, 
again more so in Britain.  In this case, firms generally separate themselves from part of the 
income stream.  In a divestment, the income stream is sold to another party normally in return 
for a cash payment, in a demerger the firm’s cash flow is split into two or more parts, but the 
  
  UK D UK D
Count 44 22 60 38
% 84.6% 71.0% 84.5% 90.5%
Count 27 10 39 12
% 51.9%*** 32.3%*** 54.9% 28.6%
Count 7 7 5 2
% 13.5% 22.6% 7.0% 4.8%
Total Number of Firms 52 31 71 42
None of the above
1999 1996
Mergers & Acquisitions
Demergers & Divestments
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ownership remains fixed (at least at the time of the break-up).  Both restructuring methods 
result in a reduction of the size of the firm and an increase in corporate focus. 
 As was known from the previous survey, divestments and demergers were only half 
as popular in Germany than in Britain.  It was therefore interesting to see if the two countries 
have also converged in their use of this corporate restructuring tool.  In addition, one would 
expect the numbers of mergers and acquisitions to roughly correspond with those of 
demergers19 and divestments, as by definition the number of divestments and acquisitions 
should be identical. 
 In this survey, more than half of the British respondents reported that they engaged in 
this activity, compared with only one third of the Germans.  Seven firms in both countries 
stated that they had not altered their organisation in this way, amounting to 14% in Britain 
and 23% in Germany.  This is a noteworthy increase since 1996 when the same figures were 
7% and 5% respectively.  In addition, statistically significant differences in respect to 
divestments and demergers could be identified for the two  countries, but not so for mergers 
and acquisitions.  The large and statistically significant difference in divestment and 
demerger activity is quite surprising; large British and German companies have not 
converged in respect of divestments and demergers.  Various factors might have influenced 
this lack of convergence.  One important reason is the difference in the taxation of divestment 
proceeds.  With the changes of the tax law in Germany after 1st January 2002, one would 
have expected a high number of corporate divestments to occur.  However, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that this has not yet occurred, which might partly lay in the falling stock 
market valuations in 2002 and 2003.  Another factor may be differences in corporate 
governance.  As an example, the German stakeholder model seems to allow firms to have 
lower returns on capital.  This would mean that firms are under less pressure to sell off less 
profitable units.  However, this conflicts with other evidence of this research, which showed 
that firms appear to be under the same pressure from both the financial as well as the product 
market in both countries.  Another conclusion is that large firms might actively acquire 
private firms and those smaller firms that fall below the size threshold of this research.  As 
the figures for acquisitions and divestments are considerably different, particularly for 
Germany, one can assume that the difference in the number of firms is drawn from outside 
the group of the largest 250 firms.  Large firms actively acquire smaller firms. 
 Disentangling the data further by splitting it by size reveals that small firms are less 
active in mergers and acquisitions as well as demergers and divestments.  About 18% of 
small British and 26% of small German firms stated that they were engaged in neither of the 
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two over the last five years.  However, as established earlier in this chapter, small German 
firms are only about one quarter of the size of British firms.  This would naturally imply that 
small firms are less active in the M&A market, as the activity in the M&A market requires 
certain minimums of organisational and financial strength.  The detailed results for large and 
small firms are depicted in Appendix 13. 
 Over the last century, the various merger waves were characterised by distinct merger 
activity: horizontal, vertical or conglomerate.  To identify the type of merger driving the 
current merger wave, the following question was asked: “If you have engaged in large-scale 
mergers and acquisitions, has your strategy been to merge with / acquire companies that until 
then were:” (answers depicted in Table 6).   
 
Table 6:  M&A Motive 
Cross-country comparison: *p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 An overwhelming majority of all the firms that expanded their operation via M&A 
did so horizontally20.  More than 95% of British and 86% of German firms acquired other 
firms with this motive in mind; figures similar to those in the 1996 survey.  About 15% of 
companies in both countries integrated with their suppliers, compared with 5% of the UK and 
24% of German firms in 1996.  Greater international competition seems to give anti-trust 
authorities the ability to allow horizontal mergers and acquisitions.  Firms appear to make 
readily use of this newfound freedom.  On the other hand, unrelated diversification appears to 
have largely gone out of fashion.  In 1996, about a third of the German firms were expanding 
into unrelated lines of business, compared with 16% in Britain.  Over the current survey 
period, less than 5% of German firms and less than 10% of British firms were doing so.  By 
comparing the results of the current survey with those from 1996, it appears that German and 
British firms may be converging upon a similar approach in respect of M&A strategy.  The 
  
  UK D UK D
Count 7 3 3 9
% 15.9% 13.6% 5.3%*** 23.7%***
Count 42 19 53 32
% 95.5% 86.4% 93.0% 84.2%
Count 4 1 9 13
% 9.1% 4.5% 15.8%** 34.2%**
Total number of firms 44 22 57 38
Competing in unrelated 
business 
(Unrelated diversification)
1999 1996
Your supplier or customer 
(Vertical expansion)
Competing in the same line of 
business 
(Horizontal expansion)
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cross-country differences for unrelated diversification and vertical integration were 
statistically significant between the two countries in 1996, but are not so any longer.  No 
important differences appear to exist between large and small firms (Appendix 14).  It seems 
that the increasing integration of the European market helps to erode national differences.  
These results support the claim that firms appear to work in an increasingly similar 
environment facing comparable product and capital market pressures. 
 Over the last 10 years, most of the growth in international production has been via 
cross-border M&A rather than greenfield investment.  Market entry through mergers and 
acquisitions over greenfield investment has essentially two advantages: fast track access to 
new markets and access to proprietary assets.  “Cross-border M&As are growing so rapidly 
in importance precisely because they provide firms with the fastest way of acquiring tangible 
and intangible assets in different countries, and because they allow firms to restructure 
existing operations nationally or globally to exploit synergies and obtain strategic 
advantages” (UNCTAD, 2000, p. XXI).   
 To learn more about the geographic focus of M&A activity and the participation of 
large British and German firms in this latest cross-border M&A restructuring activity, firms 
were asked: “Has your M&A activity been mainly geared towards:”  (Answers depicted in 
Table 7.) 
 
Table 7:  Geographic Focus of M&A Activity 
Cross-country comparison: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
British firms use mergers and acquisitions primarily to expand abroad, with 75% of all firms 
responding in this way.  About 7% of British firms gave equal focus to their home and 
international markets.  This is in contrast to German firms, of which 36% focused primarily 
  
  UK D UK D
Count 8 8 17 12
% 18.2% 36.4% 28.8% 32.4%
Count 33 6 30 11
% 75.0%*** 27.3%*** 50.9%** 29.7%**
Count 3 8 12 14
% 6.8%** 36.4%** 20.3%* 37.8%*
Total number of firms 44 22 59 37
Roughly equal
1999 1996
The domestic market
The international market
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on their home market and another 36% on their home and international markets in roughly 
equal measure.  These findings are generally in line with the more detailed results for small 
and large companies as shown in Appendix 13. 
 In respect of geographical focus, firms in each country seem to follow distinctly 
different paths.  Cross-country differences are statistically significant for the ‘international 
market’ and the ‘roughly equal’ strategy.  Here, no convergence between the two countries 
can be identified.  It seems that British firms are far more determined to take part in the 
global rationalisation of assets and the attempt to open up new markets via mergers and 
acquisitions.  Here, the ‘strong’ pound in the foreign exchange market might have supported 
their desire to internationalise. 
 Overall, the desire to increase the strategic focus of the firm, often in areas that 
promise high growth potential in the future, and to expand the geographic spread of the firm 
in its chosen industry were the main drivers of M&A activity in both countries.  These were 
the recurring themes offered by managers when asked to elaborate on the motivation to 
engage in M&A or divestment activity. 
 
Performance effects  
 
Questions were posed in the 1999 survey about the perceived performance effects of both 
M&A and demerger and divestments activities.  The question focused on how managers 
perceive the performance effects of their own actions.  Sirrower (1997) established for US 
data from the 1980s that only 35% of all M&A announcements effects were in positive 
territory.  This means that the market expects only about 35% of all merger and acquisition 
proposals to create value.  The most prominent studies on the performance effects of mergers 
for Britain are by Limmack (1991) and Franks and Harris (1989), revealing that following the 
merger announcement shareholders in the target company enjoy a wealth increase of some 
30% while shareholders in the bidding company do not lose.  In the long run, however, 
Limmack found significantly negative returns for the shareholders in the bidding company in 
the UK; a finding which corresponds to Brühner’s (1991) finding for Germany.  One would 
therefore expect the results of the survey to be roughly in line with those of the empirical 
studies.  A question about the perceived performance effects of mergers and acquisitions 
allows the comparison of the empirical results with the perceived results of management.  
This might help to explain why managers engage themselves in M&A activity despite the low 
propensity for such deals to succeed. 
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 We asked: “Did your Merger & Acquisition activity have a positive impact on your 
share price?”  (Answers depicted in Table 8.) 
 
Table 8:  Performance Effects of Mergers and Acquisitions  
 
 Almost 60% of British and just over 40% of German firms thought that their M&A 
activity had a positive impact on their share price.  About one third of all respondents in both 
countries could not identify any clear effects.  Only 11% of the British respondents thought 
their M&A activity had a negative impact on the share price, although 27% of German firms 
thought so.  The above results were unaffected by the type of M&A activity, i.e. whether 
firms increased or decreased their degree of diversification via mergers and acquisitions.  The 
change in the degree of diversification had no impact on the perceived performance of the 
transaction.  Size, however, appears to have had an influence on performance.  About half of 
all small British and German companies are of the opinion that mergers and acquisitions had 
a positive impact on performance, with the remaining indicating either a negative or no clear 
effect.  Amongst large firms, more than 70% of British firms indicated a positive impact of 
mergers and acquisitions, whereas the same number of large German firms stated no clear 
effect.  The results, classified by size, are depicted in the Appendix 16. 
 Based on the empirical evidence outlined above, a far gloomier evaluation of the 
performance effects was expected.  It is difficult to assess whether the obtained results were a 
correct assessment of the performance effects, or if they are the result of misperception or 
deliberate misrepresentation.  Perhaps managers have an inherent incentive to overestimate 
the performance.  However, assuming that managers do indeed report the performance effects 
correctly, one would have to conclude that managers appear to systematically overestimate 
the performance effects of their merger and acquisition activity.  Prospect theory might in 
  UK D
Count 26 9
% 59.1% 40.9%
Count 5 6
% 11.4% 27.3%
Count 13 7
% 29.5% 31.8%
Total number of firms 44 22
Not clear
1999
Yes
No
"Positive Impact on the Share Price?"
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part be able to explain this systematic misperception.  In any case, the above data gives 
reason to believe that managers do indeed act rationally when entering into a merger or 
acquisition process, but might systematically overestimate its performance impact. 
 For similar reasons, we also asked about the performance effects of divestments and 
demergers on the share price of the firm.  “Did your Divestment/Demerger activity have a 
positive impact on your share price?”  The results are depicted in Table 9 below.  Almost 
60% of the British and more than 40% of the German respondents claimed that the reduction 
in the size of the company through divestments had a positive effect on their share price - a 
similar result to the perceived performance effects of M&A.  About 10% claimed that it had 
no effect, with 33% and 44% of the respondents in the respective countries stating that the 
performance effects were unclear.  The results stratified by size are shown in Appendix 17.   
 
Table 9:  Performance Effects of Divestments and Demergers  
 
 The relative low number of respondents, in particular for Germany, does not allow us 
to draw overall conclusions from this question. 
 
Management buy-outs 
 
Management buy-outs (MBOs) and leveraged buy-outs (LBOs) are important elements in the 
process of corporate restructuring and were a dominant feature of the capital markets in the 
US and Europe in the 1980s.  As Thompson and Wright (1987, p. 8) point out, management 
buy-outs were a predominantly European feature, focusing on the “re-establishment of 
ownership and control in the hands of operating management”.  A management buy-out is 
normally backed by venture capitalists that, together with the new management, take an 
  UK D
Count 16 4
% 59.3% 44.4%
Count 2 1
% 7.4% 11.1%
Count 9 4
% 33.3% 44.4%
Total number of firms 27 9
Not clear
1999
Yes
No
"Positive Impact on the Share Price?"
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equity stake in the newly formed company.  The remaining purchasing price is normally 
financed by debt capital, often below investment grade (junk bonds).  In contrast to the 
European management buy-outs, American buy-outs do not necessarily include the 
incumbent management.  American buy-outs also involved much larger buy-out targets.  The 
buy-out concept has its origin in the United States, and spread to Europe via Britain.  Wright 
et al. (1993) documents that many, in particular British, management buy-outs were driven by 
the separation of functioning business units from insolvent companies.  The authors have 
shown, however, that buy-outs from insolvent business have a “significantly higher risk of 
failure than general buy-outs” (p. 20).  Other factors driving corporate buy-outs are, 
following Thompson and Wright (1987), the death of the owner, or disposals of 
underperforming or strategically unimportant lines of business.  Lastly, the privatisation of 
formerly state-owned companies was a motivation for management buy-outs.  This was an 
important feature of German management buy-outs.   
 We were interested to see if management buy-outs are still used as an important 
restructuring vehicle in the late 1990s.  Indirectly it was also of interest to see if management 
buy-outs are a restructuring tool primarily used in recessive  times, or if it is also an important 
feature in boom times.  To establish the level of and change in MBO activity in Britain and 
Germany, we asked if the company has sold any part of its operation via management buy-
outs since 1995.  We received the following answers on Table 10: 
 
Table 10:  Management Buy-Outs 
Cross-country differences are significant at the 5% level in 1999, and at the 1% level in 1996 
 
 The popularity of MBOs has declined in both countries since 1996.  This was 
particularly prominent amongst British firms.  In Britain, about 37% of all respondents said 
that they had engaged in an MBO since 1995, and were more than twice as likely than their 
German counterparts to do so.  About one third of the British firms experienced two MBOs, 
UK D UK D
Count 19 5 44 9
% 37.3% 16.1% 59.5% 21.4%
Count 32 26 30 33
% 62.7% 83.9% 40.5% 78.6%
Total number of firms 51 31 74 42
1999 1996
Yes
No
"Sold Any Part of Your Operation via 
MBO?"
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with another third having three MBOs over the last five years.  German firms, however, only 
executed one MBO per firm.  Particularly active in MBOs were those British firms that stated 
in question 1 that they aimed to reduce their degree of diversification (14 out of those 19 that 
were involved in an MBO).  Small British firms seem to be particularly active in divesting 
parts of their operation via management buy-outs (Appendix 18).   
 The results show that the use of management buy-outs as a tool for corporate 
restructuring has slowed considerably in the last five years than compared with the early parts 
of the 1990s.  In Britain, firms mainly used this restructuring vehicle over this investigation 
period to reduce their degree of diversification.  The buy-out of insolvent businesses appears 
to have decreased in importance, a likely result of lower insolvency rates common in times of 
economic prosperity.  This would imply that the success rates of buy-outs in general were 
higher than over the comparable period five years ago.   
 
Joint ventures and strategic alliances 
 
Joint ventures and strategic alliances are considered hybrid modes of organisation.  On the 
organisational continuum between coordination through hierarchy on the one hand and 
market based coordination using the price mechanism on the other, joint ventures and 
strategic alliances are set in between (Lorange and Roos, 1992).  Seen along the 
organisational continuum, joint ventures are closer to hierarchies, and strategic alliances 
closer to markets.  Joint ventures and strategic alliances are used for a variety of objectives.  
Joint ventures create a new legal entity, formed by two or more businesses contributing 
capital and knowledge to the joint venture.  They are often of limited scope and duration 
(Weston et al., 1997).  Strategic alliances are a co-operative agreement between two or more 
firms to share certain services and/or knowledge for the benefit of both parties.  Hill (2000) 
claims that the 1980s and 1990s saw an explosion of the number of strategic alliances, which 
are often used as a mode of entry into foreign markets.  Strategic alliances are also used to 
share large fixed costs in the development of new products or processes, to bring together 
complimentary skills and assets that neither company could easily develop on its own, and to 
establish technological standards (Lorange and Roos, 1992 and Contractor and Lorange, 
1988).  Similar motives drive joint ventures. 
 Joint ventures and strategic alliances share an inherent problem, namely that firms 
enter co-operative agreements with potential and actual competitors.  Critics, for example, 
claim that the success of the Japanese machine tool and semiconductor industry largely rests 
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on technology that was transferred from American firms in strategic alliances (ditto).  In 
addition, firms do not always command sufficient control over the entity, limiting the degree 
of influence, which in some cases might be necessary to align the joint venture or strategic 
alliances with its global strategy or to protect it from expropriation by the partner.   
 It is of great interest to identify as to whether the general trend towards joint ventures 
and strategic alliances has changed over the last five years.  Since both joint ventures and 
strategic alliances have similar strategic objectives, the question was combined in both 
surveys to: “have you engaged in a policy of joint ventures and strategic alliances with other 
partners?”.  The results are depicted in Table 11: 
 
Table 11:  Joint Ventures and Strategic Alliances 
 
 Joint ventures and strategic alliances have been of equal importance for British and 
German industrial firms.  44% of British and 42% of German said that they had been 
involved in a joint venture or strategic alliance.  Joint ventures and strategic alliances include, 
on average, only minor parts of the organisation.  Most respondents indicated that only about 
5% of sales was generated by a joint venture or strategic alliance21.  This indicates that those 
firms that enter joint ventures or strategic alliances are well aware of the difficulties of these 
hybrid forms of organisation.  However, this form of corporate restructuring is clearly 
favoured amongst large firms, of which more than two thirds indicate their use for both 
countries (see Appendix 19 for details).  Comparing the results of the current survey with 
those from the 1996 survey, it appears that German firms had not changed their approach to 
this form of restructuring, whereas British firms slightly reduced the use of joint ventures and 
strategic alliance by about 8%.  Comparing these results with those of question 4b, it 
becomes apparent that British firms have reduced the number of joint ventures and strategic 
alliances in favour of mergers and acquisitions as their primary form of market entry.  Those 
British firms that engaged in joint ventures and strategic alliances did so far more frequently 
  
  UK D UK D
Count 23 13 38 18
% 44.2% 41.9% 51.4% 42.9%
Count 29 18 36 24
% 55.8% 58.1% 48.6% 57.2%
Total number of firms 52 31 74 42
1999 1996
Yes
No
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than the German firms.  On average, they were involved in 4.1 such agreements per firm, 
compared with a frequency of 2.5 for the German firms.  In the most extreme case, a firm 
from the British food industry was involved in 20 such joint ventures and strategic alliances. 
 In conclusion, German firms kept their involvement in joint ventures or strategic 
alliances constant whereas British firms have slightly reduced it.  Firms in both countries 
seem to have converged to the same level of activity, which might be preconditioned by the 
level of market necessities22 as opposed to firm specific choices. 
 
Motivation for structural change 
 
Corporate restructuring is widely associated with the disciplining of poorly performing 
management and the reorganisation of underperforming firms (Mayer, 1998).  Well 
functioning corporate governance through internal or external control mechanisms and 
pressures by competitive forces should ensure that the firm functions optimally now and in 
the future.  Fundamentally, corporate governance is concerned with the protection of 
investors’ rights.  An efficient corporate governance system should ensure that investors get 
some share of the return on their investment, and ensure that managers do not expropriate the 
capital for sub-optimal investment projects (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).   
 Here we were interested to identify the main drivers behind the corporate 
restructuring efforts of the largest British and German companies.  In particular we were 
interested to see the level of corporate governance performed by competitive forces and 
pressures by the capital market, and if significant differences persist between the two 
countries.  Berglof (1997), for example, argues that whilst competitive forces might mitigate 
the agency problems, they are themselves insufficient to solve it.  Prowse (1998, cited by 
Webb, 1998, p. 3) argues that an “an efficient corporate governance mechanism depends 
upon the right mix of the competitive environment, the legal protection available to outside 
financiers, ownership structure and the strength of contractual mechanisms in financial 
contracts”. 
 We asked: “If your company has changed its corporate structure significantly over the 
last five years, was this due to increasing competition in the product market, pressure from 
the capital market or both? Please rate the importance of both factors between 1=low and 
5=high”.  The results are presented in Table 12. 
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Table 12:  Motivation for Change 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Companies in both countries felt that their corporate restructuring was more in 
response to product market than to capital market pressure.  Product market pressure had an 
average score of 3.6 in Britain and 3.8 in Germany.  Capital market pressure returned an 
average score of 2.7 for British firms and 2.5 for German firms.  This demonstrates that 
German companies are apparently becoming almost as responsive to ‘shareholder value’ 
considerations as their British counterparts.  Both countries seem to converge in respect to 
product and capital market pressures.  The results are very similar for the two countries, 
indicating that the European market for both goods and capital is functioning relatively well, 
and that in respect to those two corporate governance variables, no considerable differences 
exist.  The diversification strategy of firms (increase or decrease in the degree of 
diversification) had thereby practically no influence on the above results.  Disentangling the 
data further by size of the respondents’ company shows that product market pressure seems 
to be particularly intense for both large British and small German firms (Appendices 20 and 
21). 
 Some individual companies added qualifying comments.  One British engineering 
company reported that “price pressure from our customer base has been and still is extreme”.  
Another said: “the real driver is the need to focus on customer needs fast”.  A leading oil 
company spoke of “intensified competition due to market liberalisation and new entrants”.  
One British company noted that the strength of the pound had enhanced the case for a 
narrower focus, and for getting out of sectors where little product differentiation was 
  
  UK D UK D
Count 2 1 10 7
% 5.7% 4.0% 32.3% 29.2%
Count 4 3 7 7
% 11.4% 12.0% 22.6% 29.2%
Count 8 4 2 4
% 22.9% 16.0% 6.5% 16.7%
Count 14 10 6 3
% 40.0% 40.0% 19.4% 12.5%
Count 7 7 6 3
% 20.0% 28.0% 19.4% 12.5%
Number of firms Count 35 25 31 24
5 (High)
Mean 3.6 3.8
1 (Low)
2
3 (Medium)
4
2.7 2.5
Product Market 
Pressure
Capital Market 
Pressure
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possible.  Another spoke of shifting from low-growth “old economy” businesses to high-
growth activities.   
 One British company spoke of the need for simpler corporate structures, which 
analysts could understand, helping them to forecast performance more easily.  Several 
German companies referred to “shareholder value” as a factor in their decision-making.  One 
of them commented that the capital market had to be taken seriously, but “we should not 
surrender unconditionally.” 
 
The performance effects of corporate restructuring 
 
As a last step, the various measures of corporate restructuring that were discussed above were 
related to the various performance measures of the first part of this chapter. 
 Four performance measures were selected (as dependent variable) which were each 
regressed against corporate restructuring efforts.  Each regression was controlled for the 
country fixed effect.  The regression coefficients are depicted in Table 13.  Each row of the 
table refers to a different bivariate regression.  The performance effects were: return on 
shareholders equity %, return on capital employed %, operating profit margin %, pre-tax 
profit margin %.  The selected measures of corporate restructuring were: The degree of 
diversification (divers), involvement in a merger and acquisition (MA+), involvement in a 
divestment and demerger (MA-), involvement in a vertical (ma_1), horizontal (ma_2) or 
conglomerate (ma_3) merger or acquisition.  In addition, it was tested if there is a correlation 
between the type of geographic expansion and performance.  The variables tested for were 
expansion in the domestic market (ma_4), international market (ma_5) and roughly equal 
(ma_6).  The involvement in a management buy-out (mbo_1) or joint venture and strategic 
alliance (jv) were the last corporate restructuring activities analysed.   
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Table 13:  Correlation Coefficients of Performance Variables with 
Restructuring Methods  
 
  
Return 
on 
s'holders 
equity %
Return on 
capital 
employed %
Operating 
profit 
margin %
Pre-tax 
profit 
margin %
DIVERS99 7.99 -2.17 0.08 -0.42
MA+ -18.06 3.10 -2.55 -3.04
MA- -32.31 -0.25 2.40 2.75
MA_1 40.20 -15.07 -3.90 -4.77
MA_2 -8.96 -3.01 -0.68 -1.41
MA_3 43.42 -23.98   -8.26**   -13.92***
MA_4 -0.73 2.94 3.09 1.92
MA_5 -17.01 1.49   -6.15*** -6.75
MA_6 18.26 -5.10 3.32 4.20
MBO_1_99 21.06 -14.62 0.88 1.28
JV 18.28 3.90 0.63 0.06
*: 10% Significance Level    
**: 5% Significance Level    
***: 1% Significance Level    
 
 Interpreting the results, it has to be stated that most correlations did not produce any 
significant results.  However, the involvement of firms in conglomerate type mergers had a 
significant negative impact on operating profit and pre-tax profit.  The involvement in a 
conglomerate merger resulted on average in an 8.2% reduction in operating profit margin and 
a 13.9% reduction in pre-tax profit.  In addition, the involvement in an international merger 
had a negative impact on the operating profit margin of 6.1 percent, but no impact on any of 
the other performance measure. 
 
 
4.  Summary and Conclusion 
 
This paper explores the ongoing corporate restructuring efforts amongst the largest 250 non-
financial firms in Britain and Germany.  In its first part, publicly available data for the 
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population group is used to establish development patterns in the size and performance of 
those firms during the 1990s.  It was established that larger firms - those that belong to the 
FTSE 100 and DAX 100 indices – are roughly of equal size.  This is in contrast to the smaller 
firms in the population, where British firms seem to be about five times larger than their 
German counterparts.  Comparing firm performance indicators for both countries is 
somewhat limited, as both rely on two distinctly different accounting systems.  Certain 
identities could be identified though.  First, large British and German firms seem to have 
converged to a similar level of return on shareholder equity.  Second, there is a distinct 
difference in the level of return on capital employed and operating margin between the two 
countries, which most likely is the result of differences in accounting practices.  Third, large 
British firms appear to have both a higher operating margin and return on capital employed.  
The same performance identities cannot be established for Germany.  If anything, smaller 
firms might be slightly more successful than larger ones.  Fourth, the capital employed per 
employee is stable for Britain since the mid 1990s.  The second part of this paper outlines the 
results of a questionnaire survey that was sent to the chief executives of the target firms; the 
largest 250 non-financial firms in both Britain and Germany.  In contrast to a similar survey 
that was conducted in 1996, it was established that almost as many firms increased their 
related diversification as decreased it, with the remaining ones not changing their degree of 
diversification.  The most prominent form of corporate restructuring was still the horizontal 
expansion via mergers and acquisitions.  Expansion into unrelated lines of business was, 
unlike in the last survey, negligible.  In addition, in particular British firms used M&A to 
expand their business internationally.  Asked about the perceived performance effect of the 
M&A activity, almost 60% of British and 40% of German respondents claimed that M&A 
has positively influenced their share price.  Companies in both countries still attempt to 
reduce the number of layers, albeit the British ones from a higher initial level.  In addition, it 
appears that firms in both countries have significantly increased the number of headquarter 
staff over the last five years.  In another question, managers were asked to rank the influence 
of both product market pressure and capital market pressure on their decision to restructure 
the operation.  Companies in both countries felt that their corporate restructuring was more in 
response to product market than capital market pressure.  It seems that German companies 
are becoming almost as responsive to ‘shareholder value’ consideration as their British 
counterparts. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1 
Size:  Employment 
Fixed Sample 
 
 
Full Sample 
 
 
Appendix 2 
Size:  Sales 
Fixed Sample  
 
 FTSE250 FTSE100 Small: D DAX100 
year Average N StDev Average N StDev Average N StDev Average N StDev 
1990 11,212 128 15,547 53,532 55 56,600 2,141 108 2,915 42,223 63 66,836 
1991 11,128 127 15,615 53,567 56 55,221 2,316 110 3,250 43,287 66 67,635 
1992 11,217 127 16,665 50,085 56 51,909 2,349 109 3,180 45,763 64 70,822 
1993 11,034 128 15,878 47,703 55 49,105 2,281 114 3,091 43,592 65 67,507 
1994 11,287 128 16,015 45,920 55 48,108 2,250 112 2,894 43,186 65 66,060 
1995 11,018 129 13,837 46,615 55 47,898 2,390 96 3,010 44,478 63 64,830 
1996 11,580 127 14,098 49,931 55 49,871 2,361 97 2,798 43,605 65 64,675 
1997 11,383 129 13,372 51,210 54 50,924 2,168 122 2,729 43,549 66 64,646 
1998 11,745 128 13,213 53,118 55 51,664 2,201 118 2,616 43,716 66 67,628 
FTSE250 FTSE100 Small: D DAX100
year Average N StDev Average N StDev Average N StDev Average N StDev
1990 11,265 132 15,343 53,674 56 56,093 2,141 108 2,915 42,223 63 66,836
1991 10,910 134 15,328 52,309 59 54,318 2,291 114 3,197 42,865 67 67,209
1992 10,828 136 16,262 47,567 61 50,817 2,336 114 3,116 45,285 65 70,372
1993 10,537 140 15,394 45,178 61 47,839 2,232 123 2,992 42,565 67 66,743
1994 10,300 148 15,264 42,822 62 46,818 2,238 120 2,806 41,630 68 64,988
1995 10,039 152 13,226 42,830 63 46,605 2,280 113 2,808 44,807 69 66,585
1996 10,253 157 13,294 45,192 64 48,453 2,219 120 2,595 45,371 73 67,644
1997 10,215 167 12,861 43,490 68 48,736 2,058 155 2,491 43,903 76 66,570
1998 10,297 179 12,550 44,799 71 49,605 2,125 153 2,382 49,174 78 82,787
year Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev
1990 834,465 126 971,401 4,887,939 56 7,352,721 245,371 122 384,714 5,539,554 65 8,295,719
1991 857,483 125 1,017,853 5,073,926 57 7,291,963 270,719 121 399,732 5,941,378 67 8,967,413
1992 877,109 125 1,029,904 5,184,758 57 7,571,866 281,488 121 405,339 6,319,424 66 9,475,563
1993 948,609 125 1,103,796 5,676,641 56 8,431,381 280,300 123 399,076 6,263,657 66 9,165,593
1994 1,013,749 124 1,152,709 5,788,624 56 8,384,323 296,968 122 398,544 6,676,362 66 9,722,652
1995 1,123,616 125 1,240,948 6,386,418 56 9,145,849 330,717 122 460,978 7,202,304 66 10,464,869
1996 1,194,825 123 1,259,806 7,024,773 56 10,413,954 324,935 121 432,117 7,559,204 66 11,174,874
1997 1,193,682 125 1,263,298 6,835,735 55 9,909,216 350,499 120 470,643 8,454,940 66 12,544,748
1998 1,244,214 124 1,288,681 6,545,241 56 7,933,017 349,138 119 450,823 8,816,997 66 13,516,362
Average 1,031,972 5,933,784 303,349 6,974,869
Sales
FTSE250 FTSE100
UK (£)
Small: D DAX100
Germany (€)
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Full Sample  
 
 
Appendix 3 
Market Value  
Fixed Sample  
 
 
Full Sample  
 
year Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev
1990 832,683 130 958,173 4,856,871 57 7,290,550 245,371 122 384,714 5,539,554 66 8,295,719
1991 834,191 132 1,001,101 4,993,863 60 7,114,656 266,520 127 391,337 5,874,344 68 8,917,390
1992 841,148 134 1,010,314 4,981,308 62 7,299,882 273,397 130 393,241 6,246,057 67 9,422,661
1993 898,724 136 1,079,905 5,428,242 62 8,056,256 269,396 136 382,263 6,105,548 68 9,074,564
1994 916,382 143 1,112,506 5,436,094 63 7,981,801 287,299 136 380,576 6,263,491 71 9,490,993
1995 1,001,471 147 1,193,679 5,908,245 64 8,665,398 308,926 145 428,041 7,088,862 73 10,563,767
1996 1,023,124 152 1,201,668 6,421,390 65 9,797,980 303,660 154 410,139 7,686,643 74 11,330,234
1997 1,055,789 162 1,223,614 6,044,915 69 9,025,528 327,965 153 443,038 8,543,573 74 12,614,947
1998 1,079,028 174 1,220,274 5,738,243 72 7,223,111 329,733 154 422,729 10,645,482 76 19,757,907
Average 942,505 5,534,352 290,252 7,110,395
Sales
FTSE250 FTSE100
UK (£)
Small: D DAX100
Germany (€)
year Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev
1990 422,934 130 486,654 3,470,586 56 4,106,069 122,628 108 135,772 1,773,728 61 2,366,905
1991 513,786 129 536,820 4,252,392 57 4,817,512 110,209 117 119,346 1,887,857 63 2,784,303
1992 553,524 129 581,785 4,492,438 57 5,007,304 99,197 119 117,530 1,756,918 63 2,686,110
1993 731,357 129 693,692 5,412,883 56 6,042,323 121,519 123 132,646 2,413,459 63 3,623,665
1994 754,178 128 661,788 5,600,697 56 5,696,708 120,313 124 132,875 2,535,303 63 3,677,006
1995 778,791 129 685,703 6,487,065 56 7,172,970 102,193 125 111,836 2,611,956 66 4,044,893
1996 929,268 127 763,871 7,577,719 56 8,157,240 94,212 125 108,422 3,543,239 66 5,938,780
1997 928,637 129 730,535 8,899,668 55 11,089,413 114,142 124 123,096 4,606,637 66 7,557,901
1998 907,648 128 768,011 10,959,009 56 14,116,615 120,447 122 135,816 5,178,476 66 8,454,127
Average 724,458 6,350,273 111,651 2,923,064
MV
FTSE250 FTSE100
UK
Small: D DAX100
Germany
year Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev
1990 417,224 134 480,976 3,440,125 57 4,075,736 122,628 108 135,772 1,773,728 61 2,366,905
1991 496,244 136 530,530 4,152,963 60 4,714,956 109,654 119 118,448 1,887,857 63 2,784,303
1992 532,612 138 575,419 4,284,722 62 4,853,183 99,471 122 116,579 1,756,918 63 2,686,110
1993 690,279 141 681,683 5,261,285 62 5,793,561 122,731 129 131,398 2,413,459 63 3,623,665
1994 687,093 148 647,158 5,411,351 63 5,447,375 120,031 133 131,247 2,474,579 65 3,635,858
1995 708,086 152 670,025 6,214,558 64 6,835,102 102,437 139 109,862 2,465,453 72 3,903,947
1996 831,885 157 739,456 7,233,842 65 7,769,103 94,108 146 104,180 3,925,325 75 7,325,705
1997 847,247 167 716,917 8,036,845 69 10,264,282 112,046 154 116,959 4,912,744 76 8,671,062
1998 867,194 179 748,392 9,875,657 72 12,834,835 116,643 157 127,700 6,966,540 78 14,476,888
Average 675,318 5,990,150 111,083 3,175,178
Small: D DAX100
Germany
MV
FTSE250 FTSE100
UK
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Appendix 4 
Dividend Payment 
Fixed Sample  
 
 
Full Sample  
 
 
Performance Measures 
 
Appendix 5 
Return on Shareholder Equity 
Fixed Sample  
1% Trimmed Mean on both sides of the distribution per country 
 
year Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev 
1990 8.3 130 8.9 8.6 56 6.5 1.9 91 2.2 1.0 61 1.6 
1991 8.4 1.1% 129 8.4 9.3 7.1% 57 6.9 1.8 -3.8% 113 2.3 0.9 -2.0% 65 1.7 
1992 8.2 -2.3% 129 8.7 9.4 1.6% 57 7.0 1.9 4.0% 118 3.7 0.8 -16.3% 64 1.4 
1993 8.6 5.5% 129 9.2 10.2 8.7% 56 7.7 2.0 4.4% 123 4.4 0.8 0.7% 64 1.5 
1994 9.3 8.2% 128 9.5 11.2 9.5% 56 8.2 1.9 -4.9% 123 2.9 0.9 16.0% 66 2.0 
1995 9.8 5.2% 129 8.2 12.5 11.7% 56 8.9 2.0 4.9% 124 3.9 0.6 -34.7% 66 1.1 
1996 10.8 10.0% 127 8.5 13.5 8.3% 56 9.4 1.9 -5.4% 125 3.4 0.7 14.2% 66 1.2 
1997 11.3 5.0% 129 9.1 14.2 4.9% 55 10.2 2.6 38.7% 124 8.5 0.9 33.3% 66 1.6 
1998 12.4 9.6% 128 10.5 15.3 8.0% 56 10.5 3.1 18.4% 120 13.5 1.1 20.4% 66 1.9 
Average 9.7 11.6 2.1 0.9 
Germany 
Small: D DAX100 Dividend PS 
UK 
FTSE250 FTSE100 
year Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev
1990 8.12 134 8.9 8.59 57 6.5 1.91 91 2.2 0.96 61 1.6
1991 8.01 -1.4% 136 8.3 9.17 6.7% 60 6.7 1.82 -4.4% 114 2.3 0.94 -2.0% 65 1.7
1992 7.72 -3.6% 138 8.6 9.37 2.2% 62 6.7 1.88 3.2% 123 3.7 0.79 -16.3% 64 1.4
1993 8.05 4.2% 141 9.1 10.49 12.0% 62 7.6 1.97 4.9% 131 4.3 0.79 0.7% 64 1.5
1994 8.57 6.6% 148 9.2 11.31 7.8% 63 8.1 1.86 -5.7% 136 2.8 0.90 12.8% 69 1.9
1995 8.85 3.3% 152 8.0 12.48 10.4% 64 8.9 1.87 0.5% 142 3.7 0.58 -35.1% 74 1.1
1996 9.45 6.7% 157 8.4 13.73 10.0% 65 9.5 1.80 -3.7% 150 3.3 0.66 13.9% 75 1.1
1997 9.85 4.2% 167 8.9 14.36 4.6% 69 10.3 2.26 25.6% 155 7.7 0.88 32.4% 76 1.5
1998 10.43 5.9% 179 9.9 15.22 6.0% 72 10.9 2.55 12.6% 155 12.0 1.06 21.0% 78 1.7
Average 8.8 11.6 1.99 0.84
Small: D
Germany
DAX100
Dividend PS
FTSE250 FTSE100
UK
year Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev
1990 21.1 129 20.8 28.7 55 41.6 23.4 184 28.7 7.3 124 21.7 10.8 65 11.1 8.5 189 18.8
1991 16.5 129 18.1 23.8 56 33.8 18.7 185 24.1 8.4 124 18.1 10.9 66 11.5 9.2 190 16.1
1992 14.3 129 14.8 22.9 56 31.9 16.9 185 21.7 4.4 122 32.0 1.3 66 39.3 3.3 188 34.7
1993 17.4 127 22.6 27.2 54 48.3 20.3 181 32.6 2.7 123 38.6 4.1 63 21.0 3.2 186 33.6
1994 19.6 127 23.5 16.2 53 19.3 18.6 180 22.3 5.6 124 37.2 11.4 63 16.3 7.5 187 31.8
1995 17.7 128 16.2 13.0 55 41.1 16.3 183 26.2 4.5 122 30.3 13.5 64 45.1 7.6 186 36.2
1996 17.3 125 16.8 17.3 54 50.2 17.3 179 30.8 4.1 122 41.3 19.2 64 35.8 9.3 186 40.1
1997 19.9 125 32.4 28.8 53 61.6 22.6 178 43.2 10.5 119 23.4 14.4 66 37.9 11.9 185 29.4
1998 22.2 123 43.5 23.8 52 57.3 22.6 175 47.9 10.5 120 41.7 10.2 63 40.0 10.4 183 41.0
Average 18.4 22.4 19.6 6.4 10.6 7.9
Germany
Small: D DAX100 Total
ROSE Margin 
% Total
UK
FTSE250 FTSE100
 40 
year Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev
1990 23.5 127 16.5 27.8 55 25.2 24.8 182 19.6 14.2 124 9.7 13.4 65 7.3 13.9 189 8.9
1991 20.0 124 17.1 24.4 56 23.2 21.4 180 19.3 14.5 125 10.0 12.5 67 7.5 13.8 192 9.2
1992 18.3 126 16.5 25.3 57 25.5 20.4 183 19.9 13.4 122 12.3 10.5 66 8.4 12.4 188 11.2
1993 18.9 126 16.3 26.4 55 30.2 21.2 181 21.7 11.2 121 11.5 8.7 65 8.3 10.3 186 10.6
1994 21.1 126 18.1 28.2 55 31.1 23.2 181 23.0 12.1 120 10.8 10.3 65 8.3 11.5 185 10.0
1995 20.3 125 13.8 27.6 54 27.4 22.5 179 19.2 11.3 122 11.3 11.7 65 9.0 11.4 187 10.5
1996 21.9 123 16.4 25.0 52 17.1 22.8 175 16.6 9.6 122 11.0 10.3 63 6.9 9.9 185 9.8
1997 24.8 124 20.6 29.1 52 24.6 26.1 176 21.8 11.8 122 10.1 12.5 65 8.3 12.1 187 9.5
1998 25.2 123 21.1 34.0 55 31.8 27.9 178 25.1 13.1 115 10.4 12.3 64 8.6 12.8 179 9.8
Average 21.5 27.6 23.4 12.4 11.4 12.0
Germany
Small: D DAX100 Total
Average of 
ROCE % 
stable s. Total
UK
FTSE250 FTSE100
Full Sample   
1% Trimmed Mean on both sides of the distribution per country 
 
 
Appendix 6 
Return on Capital Employed 
Fixed Sample 
1% Trimmed Mean on both sides of the distribution per country 
 
 
Full Sample 
1% Trimmed Mean on both sides of the distribution per country 
 
year Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev
1990 21.0 133 20.7 26.0 57 45.1 22.5 190 30.1 7.3 124 21.7 10.8 65 11.1 8.5 189 18.8
1991 16.5 136 26.6 20.2 60 41.0 17.7 196 31.7 8.9 130 19.0 11.0 67 11.4 9.7 197 16.8
1992 14.6 137 15.3 22.5 61 30.6 17.0 198 21.5 5.1 131 31.2 1.5 67 39.1 3.9 198 34.0
1993 17.0 139 25.1 26.7 60 45.8 19.9 199 32.9 4.8 136 39.6 4.4 65 21.0 4.7 200 34.7
1994 19.0 146 22.9 16.4 60 18.5 18.2 206 21.7 7.7 138 36.4 11.9 69 18.9 9.1 207 31.7
1995 18.0 151 17.7 13.0 63 38.8 16.5 214 25.8 6.8 144 30.8 14.6 72 42.7 9.4 216 35.3
1996 19.0 154 27.2 14.3 64 50.4 17.6 218 35.6 8.1 155 40.9 19.8 73 34.0 11.8 228 39.2
1997 20.4 162 31.0 21.8 67 59.9 20.8 229 41.4 13.0 150 24.6 15.5 76 35.8 13.9 226 28.8
1998 18.6 172 38.1 20.1 67 52.8 19.0 239 42.6 9.4 154 42.2 18.0 74 32.9 12.2 228 39.6
Average 18.2 20.1 18.8 7.9 12.0 9.2
Germany
Small: D DAX100 Total
ROSE 
Margin % Total
UK
FTSE250 FTSE100
year Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev
1990 23.3 131 16.4 30.6 57 33.3 25.5 188 23.0 14.2 124 9.7 13.4 65 7.3 13.9 189 8.9
1991 19.3 132 17.4 26.8 60 30.5 21.6 192 22.5 15.1 131 10.4 12.6 68 7.4 14.2 199 9.5
1992 19.7 136 24.7 24.7 62 24.5 21.3 198 24.7 14.0 129 12.4 10.6 67 8.4 12.8 196 11.3
1993 18.9 136 15.9 31.0 62 48.2 22.7 198 30.4 12.3 134 11.9 9.2 67 8.8 11.3 201 11.0
1994 19.8 147 19.1 29.9 63 36.5 22.9 210 25.9 13.2 133 11.1 11.2 71 9.6 12.5 204 10.6
1995 24.1 149 46.5 40.9 64 70.5 29.2 213 55.2 12.9 145 12.3 12.6 73 9.6 12.8 218 11.4
1996 21.7 152 17.3 40.9 64 68.0 27.4 216 40.5 12.0 151 11.7 12.2 74 9.8 12.1 225 11.1
1997 27.1 163 27.1 31.3 67 35.4 28.3 230 29.8 13.0 153 10.6 13.3 75 9.0 13.1 228 10.1
1998 33.7 175 69.2 33.8 71 39.6 33.7 246 62.1 14.0 147 11.0 12.6 74 8.5 13.5 221 10.2
Average 23.1 32.2 25.8 13.4 12.0 12.9
Germany
Small: D DAX100 Total
Average of 
ROCE % Total
UK
FTSE250 FTSE100
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Appendix 7 
Operating Margin 
Fixed Sample  
1% Trimmed Mean on both sides of the distribution per country 
 
 
Full Sample  
1% Trimmed Mean on both sides of the distribution per country 
 
 
Appendix 8 
Cash Flow Margin 
Fixed Sample 
1% Trimmed Mean on both sides of the distribution per country 
 
 
 
 
year Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev
1990 12.6 127 10.3 14.7 56 8.9 13.3 183 9.9 7.2 121 4.9 5.7 65 3.6 6.7 186 4.6
1991 11.4 122 10.0 13.8 57 9.4 12.2 179 9.9 6.6 119 4.8 5.7 67 4.5 6.3 186 4.7
1992 11.2 122 9.9 13.7 57 10.0 12.0 179 10.0 5.6 118 6.7 4.7 66 4.6 5.3 184 6.0
1993 11.5 124 10.8 13.8 56 10.1 12.2 180 10.6 5.6 118 6.7 3.5 66 5.6 4.8 184 6.4
1994 11.4 120 9.2 14.3 56 9.4 12.3 176 9.4 5.8 116 5.7 4.6 66 5.5 5.4 182 5.6
1995 11.8 123 10.0 14.6 56 8.8 12.7 179 9.7 5.9 118 6.1 5.0 65 5.8 5.5 183 6.0
1996 12.5 122 10.8 14.7 56 8.3 13.2 178 10.1 5.0 118 6.3 5.6 65 5.1 5.2 183 5.9
1997 12.8 125 10.1 15.2 55 8.3 13.6 180 9.6 5.7 117 5.9 6.3 66 5.2 5.9 183 5.7
1998 12.4 122 9.2 15.1 56 8.4 13.2 178 9.1 6.1 113 5.7 6.5 66 4.7 6.2 179 5.4
Average 12.0 14.4 12.7 5.9 5.3 5.7
Germany
Small: D DAX100 Total
Operating 
Margin % 
unbiased Total
UK
FTSE250 FTSE100
year Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev
1990 12.4 132 10.3 14.6 57 8.9 13.0 189 9.9 7.2 121 4.9 5.7 65 3.6 6.7 186 4.6
1991 10.8 132 10.3 13.5 60 9.3 11.7 192 10.0 6.7 125 4.8 5.7 68 4.5 6.4 193 4.7
1992 10.5 133 9.9 13.7 62 9.7 11.6 195 10.0 6.0 125 6.2 4.8 67 4.6 5.6 192 5.7
1993 10.9 135 10.0 14.0 62 9.8 11.9 197 10.0 6.1 129 6.2 3.7 68 5.7 5.2 197 6.1
1994 10.7 139 9.7 14.6 62 9.2 11.9 201 9.7 6.1 129 5.6 4.9 71 5.6 5.7 200 5.6
1995 11.5 144 10.0 15.3 63 8.8 12.6 207 9.8 6.2 141 6.1 5.9 70 5.4 6.1 211 5.9
1996 13.0 150 12.0 15.8 64 9.1 13.8 214 11.3 5.8 150 6.2 6.2 73 5.4 5.9 223 5.9
1997 13.1 162 10.4 14.7 69 11.9 13.6 231 10.9 6.2 149 5.7 6.7 73 5.5 6.4 222 5.7
1998 12.9 172 9.5 14.3 72 10.7 13.3 244 9.8 6.3 147 5.9 6.6 75 5.5 6.4 222 5.7
Average 11.8 14.5 12.6 6.3 5.6 6.0
Operating 
Margin % full 
sample Total
UK
FTSE250 FTSE100
Germany
SDAX DAX100 Total
year Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev
1990 11.9 42 9.0 15.0 13 9.2 12.6 55 9.0 8.2 118 5.3 7.8 63 4.1 8.0 181 4.9
1991 9.6 92 6.0 12.5 31 9.5 10.3 123 7.1 7.6 118 5.3 7.8 64 4.2 7.7 182 4.9
1992 10.5 114 7.8 14.1 56 9.7 11.7 170 8.6 7.1 117 6.0 7.4 64 5.3 7.2 181 5.7
1993 11.0 121 8.4 14.2 56 9.5 12.0 177 8.9 7.3 116 6.0 6.9 66 5.6 7.2 182 5.8
1994 11.6 121 8.6 14.5 55 9.4 12.5 176 8.9 7.6 118 5.6 7.6 65 5.4 7.6 183 5.5
1995 11.9 123 9.2 14.3 55 8.5 12.6 178 9.1 7.1 119 5.9 8.6 65 6.8 7.6 184 6.2
1996 12.2 122 9.4 14.5 55 8.1 12.9 177 9.0 6.4 120 7.0 8.3 66 5.9 7.1 186 6.7
1997 12.5 126 8.5 15.0 55 8.6 13.2 181 8.6 6.9 116 5.7 8.7 66 5.4 7.5 182 5.6
1998 12.8 125 9.0 15.1 56 8.2 13.5 181 8.8 7.3 111 5.7 7.9 65 4.6 7.5 176 5.3
Average 11.6 14.4 12.4 7.3 7.9 7.5
Germany
Small: D DAX100 Total
CF Margin %
Total
UK
FTSE250 FTSE100
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Full Sample  
1% Trimmed Mean on both sides of the distribution per country 
 
 
Appendix 9 
Borrowing Ratio 
Fixed Sample  
1% Trimmed Mean on both sides of the distribution per country 
 
 
Full Sample  
1% Trimmed Mean on both sides of the distribution per country 
year Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev
1990 11.8 43 8.9 14.4 14 9.1 12.4 57 9.0 8.2 118 5.3 7.8 63 4.1 8.0 181 4.9
1991 8.9 101 6.7 12.3 32 9.4 9.7 133 7.5 7.7 124 5.3 7.8 65 4.1 7.7 189 5.0
1992 9.4 126 7.8 14.1 61 9.4 11.0 187 8.6 7.1 125 5.9 7.4 65 5.3 7.2 190 5.6
1993 10.7 134 8.4 14.3 62 9.2 11.8 196 8.8 7.4 127 5.9 7.0 68 5.6 7.3 195 5.7
1994 11.4 140 8.9 14.7 61 9.1 12.4 201 9.0 7.8 131 5.6 7.7 70 5.2 7.8 201 5.5
1995 11.5 145 9.9 14.7 62 8.3 12.5 207 9.6 7.2 142 5.8 8.9 72 7.0 7.8 214 6.2
1996 12.4 148 9.0 15.4 63 8.5 13.3 211 9.0 6.9 151 6.4 8.6 74 6.2 7.5 225 6.3
1997 12.7 163 8.4 14.4 69 11.4 13.2 232 9.4 7.1 148 5.4 8.9 73 5.9 7.7 221 5.6
1998 13.3 174 9.3 14.6 72 9.4 13.7 246 9.4 7.3 144 5.2 8.6 75 6.1 7.7 219 5.6
Average 11.4 14.3 12.2 7.4 8.1 7.6
CF Margin %
Total
UK
FTSE250 FTSE100
Germany
Small: D DAX100 Total
year Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev
1990 0.6 128 0.7 0.7 56 1.5 0.6 184 1.0 0.8 124 2.2 0.7 65 0.7 0.8 189 1.8
1991 0.5 129 0.6 0.6 57 1.5 0.5 186 1.0 0.8 124 1.9 0.8 67 1.8 0.8 191 1.9
1992 0.6 129 0.7 0.6 55 0.9 0.6 184 0.7 0.9 120 2.7 1.4 66 2.6 1.0 186 2.7
1993 0.6 128 0.7 0.8 55 1.2 0.6 183 0.9 0.9 124 2.7 0.9 64 3.8 0.9 188 3.1
1994 0.5 128 0.6 0.5 56 1.2 0.5 184 0.8 1.2 123 3.1 0.8 64 2.5 1.1 187 2.9
1995 0.5 129 0.7 0.4 55 1.2 0.5 184 0.9 1.1 122 1.9 0.8 64 3.9 1.0 186 2.8
1996 0.4 125 0.6 0.4 56 1.9 0.4 181 1.2 0.9 123 2.2 0.7 63 3.4 0.9 186 2.7
1997 0.6 125 1.0 0.5 50 1.4 0.5 175 1.1 0.9 120 2.9 0.6 64 1.7 0.8 184 2.5
1998 0.6 120 1.1 0.7 52 2.0 0.7 172 1.4 0.7 119 3.0 0.6 64 3.2 0.6 183 3.0
Average 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.9 0.8 0.9
Germany
Small: D DAX100 Total
Operating 
Margin % Total
UK
FTSE250 FTSE100
year Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev
1990 0.7 133 1.0 0.7 57 1.5 0.7 190 1.2 0.6 125 2.9 0.7 65 0.7 0.6 190 2.4
1991 0.5 135 0.6 0.6 60 1.5 0.5 195 0.9 0.8 130 2.0 0.8 68 1.8 0.8 198 1.9
1992 0.5 138 0.8 0.5 60 0.9 0.5 198 0.8 0.9 129 2.7 1.4 67 2.6 1.1 196 2.7
1993 0.5 140 0.9 0.8 61 1.2 0.6 201 1.0 1.0 136 2.7 0.7 66 4.1 0.9 202 3.2
1994 0.5 148 0.7 0.4 63 1.2 0.5 211 0.9 1.3 137 3.5 1.1 71 3.9 1.2 208 3.6
1995 0.5 152 0.7 0.4 63 1.2 0.5 215 0.9 1.2 144 2.6 0.9 72 3.7 1.1 216 3.0
1996 0.4 156 1.2 0.4 65 1.8 0.4 221 1.4 0.9 156 2.9 0.5 73 3.9 0.8 229 3.3
1997 0.4 164 1.4 0.4 65 1.7 0.4 229 1.5 0.9 152 3.1 0.8 74 1.7 0.8 226 2.7
1998 0.5 171 1.4 0.6 67 1.8 0.5 238 1.5 0.7 155 3.9 0.5 75 3.1 0.6 230 3.6
Average 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.8 0.9
Borrowing 
Ratio % Total
UK
FTSE250 FTSE100
Germany
Small: D DAX100 Total
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Appendix 10 
Effective Tax Rate 
Fixed Sample 
Extreme values > 200% & negative values excluded 
 
 
Full Sample  
Extreme values > 200% & negative values excluded 
 
 
 
year Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev
1990 31.4 128 8.4 29.5 55 8.4 56.4 117 21.4 53.3 62 12.6
1991 30.2 125 13.1 34.0 56 21.9 55.4 112 19.6 53.5 63 17.2
1992 30.4 123 11.0 34.3 54 18.5 57.6 105 20.7 51.3 59 16.9
1993 31.2 123 13.5 32.6 56 19.3 55.1 96 28.8 47.0 54 19.4
1994 32.6 123 18.5 30.3 55 13.3 51.7 106 35.3 45.9 60 20.1
1995 32.7 123 14.0 30.7 56 9.0 49.4 100 28.8 41.7 59 19.1
1996 33.0 117 16.5 32.4 54 17.0 51.3 93 26.3 44.2 61 26.4
1997 31.3 125 10.7 31.6 55 16.1 47.0 105 35.4 37.5 64 15.2
1998 35.8 119 21.2 34.3 55 16.5 38.4 109 28.6 40.4 62 18.9
Total Average 32.1 32.2 51.4 46.1
UK Germany
FTSE250 FTSE100 Small DAX100
year Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev Average N StdDev
1990 31.4 131 8.3 29.4 56 8.3 56.4 117 21.4 53.3 62 12.6
1991 29.8 131 13.3 33.8 59 21.3 54.6 118 19.7 53.5 64 17.0
1992 29.9 132 11.5 33.7 59 17.8 57.3 114 20.4 51.4 60 16.8
1993 30.4 133 13.6 32.2 62 18.4 54.0 107 27.6 46.5 56 19.4
1994 31.6 142 18.4 29.5 62 13.1 50.2 121 34.1 45.4 66 19.9
1995 32.0 145 13.8 30.3 63 9.0 47.2 122 27.3 40.2 67 19.7
1996 31.4 145 16.0 31.5 62 16.2 49.4 123 24.2 43.7 70 25.1
1997 30.0 161 11.1 29.5 67 15.8 45.8 133 31.7 37.1 74 15.9
1998 33.5 166 19.3 35.4 71 22.6 40.5 134 25.7 38.6 73 19.4
Total Average 31.1 31.6 50.6 45.5
UK Germany
FTSE250 FTSE100 Small DAX100
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Appendix 11 
Capital Employed/Employee (Median) 
Full Sample 
FTSE250 FTSE100 Small: D DAX100
1990 35.58 44.36 62.79 60.88
1991 41.36 53.90 63.37 69.28
1992 44.21 60.53 65.62 71.77
1993 47.86 67.23 69.03 71.19
1994 49.45 69.59 68.67 75.44
1995 53.98 71.65 70.25 79.31
1996 53.17 75.70 72.83 81.65
1997 54.04 83.21 79.55 96.12
1998 50.72 82.80 83.10 97.67
UK (£'000) Germany (€'000)
Median
 
 
 
Fixed Sample  
 
FTSE250 FTSE100 Small: D DAX100
1990 35.58 45.44 62.93 60.04
1991 41.63 53.00 64.27 69.27
1992 45.73 59.64 66.50 71.77
1993 48.92 61.87 69.95 72.60
1994 49.45 67.33 70.41 75.81
1995 54.04 66.65 71.27 77.40
1996 53.17 66.72 73.49 81.76
1997 55.02 67.05 79.61 94.18
1998 50.77 66.00 83.70 95.44
UK Germany
Median
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Appendix 12:  Change in the Degree of Diversification by Size  
 
 
Appendix 13:  Organisational Change Due to Mergers and Acquisitions or Demergers 
and Divestments by Size  
 
 
 
  
  UK D UK D
Count 5 1 13 4
% 27.8% 12.5% 38.2% 17.4%
Count 1 2 2 4
% 5.6% 25.0% 25.4% 22.0%
Count 6 2 10 8
% 33.3% 25.0% 7.0% 14.6%
Count 4 2 4 6
% 22.2% 25.0% 11.3% 22.0%
Count 2 1 5 1
% 11.1% 12.5% 2.8% 12.2%
Count 18 8 34 23
% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Large Small
Total number of firms
 Reduced substantially
 Reduced somewhat
 Stayed about the same
 Increased somewhat
 Increased substantially
  
  UK D UK D
Count 17 7 27 15
% 94.4% 87.5% 79.4% 65.2%
Count 11 3 16 7
% 61.1% 37.5% 47.1% 30.4%
Count 1 1 6 6
% 5.6% 12.5% 17.6% 26.1%
Total number of firms 18 8 34 23
None of the above
Large Small
Mergers & Acquisitions
Demergers & Divestments
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Appendix 14:  M&A Motive by Size  
 
 
Appendix 15:  Geographic Focus of M&A Activity by Size  
 
 
Appendix 16: Performance Effects of Mergers and Acquisitions by Size  
 
  
  UK D UK D
Count 4 1 3 2
% 23.5% 14.3% 11.1% 13.3%
Count 15 6 25 13
% 88.2% 85.7% 92.6% 86.7%
Count 2 0 2 1
% 11.8% 0.0% 7.4% 6.7%
Total number of firms 17 7 27 15
Competing in unrelated 
business (Unrelated 
diversification)
Large Small
Your supplier or customer 
(Vertical expansion)
Competing in the same line of 
business (Horizontal 
expansion)
  
  UK D UK D
Count 1 3 7 5
% 5.9% 42.9% 25.9% 33.3%
Count 15 3 18 3
% 88.2% 42.9% 66.7% 20.0%
Count 1 1 2 7
% 5.9% 14.3% 7.4% 46.7%
Total number of firms 17 7 27 15
Roughly equal
Large Small
The domestic market
The international market
  UK D UK D
Count 12 2 14 7
% 70.6% 28.6% 51.9% 46.7%
Count 1 0 4 6
% 5.9% 0.0% 14.8% 40.0%
Count 4 5 9 2
% 23.5% 71.4% 33.3% 13.3%
Total number of firms 17 7 27 15
Not clear
Small
Yes
No
"Positive Impact on the Share Price?" Large
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Appendix 17:  Performance Effects of Divestments and Demergers by Size  
 
 
Appendix 18:  Management Buy-Outs 
 
 
Appendix 19: Joint Ventures and Strategic Alliances by Size  
 
 
UK D UK D
Count 5 1 14 4
% 29.4% 12.5% 41.2% 17.4%
Count 12 7 20 19
% 70.6% 87.5% 58.8% 82.6%
Total number of firms 17 8 34 23
Large Small
Yes
No
"Sold Any Part of Your Operation via 
MBO?"
  
  UK D UK D
Count 11 6 12 7
% 64.7% 75.0% 35.3% 30.4%
Count 6 2 23 16
% 35.3% 25.0% 67.6% 69.6%
Total number of firms 17 8 34 23
Large Small
Yes
No
  UK D UK D
Count 6 1 10 3
% 54.5% 33.3% 62.5% 50.0%
Count 1 1 1 0
% 9.1% 33.3% 6.3% 0.0%
Count 4 1 5 3
% 36.4% 33.3% 31.3% 50.0%
Total number of firms 11 3 16 6
Not clear
Small
Yes
No
"Positive Impact on the Share Price?" Large
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Appendix 20: Product Market Pressure by Size  
 
 
Appendix 21: Capital Market Pressure by Size  
 
 
 
 
UK D UK D
Count 1 2 0
% 0.0% 20.0% 9.5% 0.0%
Count 2 4 1
% 0.0% 40.0% 19.0% 5.3%
Count 2 2 6 2
% 14.3% 40.0% 28.6% 10.5%
Count 6 8 10
% 42.9% 0.0% 38.1% 52.6%
Count 6 1 7
% 42.9% 0.0% 4.8% 36.8%
Number of firms Count 14 5 21 19
3.1 4.4
Large Small
Mean 4.3 2.2
Product Market Pressure
1 (Low)
2
3 (Medium)
4
5 (High)
UK D UK D
Count 6 4 7
% 46.2% 0.0% 22.2% 38.9%
Count 2 3 5 4
% 15.4% 50.0% 27.8% 22.2%
Count 1 2 1 2
% 7.7% 33.3% 5.6% 11.1%
Count 1 1 5 2
% 7.7% 16.7% 27.8% 11.1%
Count 3 3 3
% 23.1% 0.0% 16.7% 16.7%
Number of firms Count 13 6 18 18
Mean 2.5 2.3
Capital Market Pressure
1 (Low)
2
3 (Medium)
4
5 (High)
2.9 2.4
Large Small
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Appendix 22: Employment Effects of Corporate Restructuring by Size  
 
  UK D UK D
Count 8 4 15 8
% 44.4% 57.1% 50.0% 34.8%
Count 9 2 11 11
% 50.0% 28.6% 36.7% 47.8%
Count 1 1 4 4
% 5.6% 14.3% 13.3% 17.4%
Total number of firms 18 7 30 23
Small
No effect
Decreased
Increased
Large
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Endnotes 
 
1  The full sample includes all firms that have reported in that year, and for which data is 
available in principle.  Due to technical circumstances at Datastream, the data provider, data 
might be missing for certain variables and years.  As it can be assumed that the error is of 
random nature the firm/data is included in the full sample. 
2  Using a Student t-test. 
3  Calculated as the average of CPI and PPI based measure.  Suggested at a seminar held at the 
London School of Economics on the 16.09.99.  Alternatively, this paper can be obtained 
under: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/ 
4  For the fixed sample. 
5  As the performance of the financial sector is closely tied to the performance of the non-
financial sector. 
6  The data does not sum up to 100% as activities with less than 3% turnover are excluded 
from the analysis. 
7  This analysis is based on an average share of activity, grouped by one-digit SIC-codes. 
8  Analysing the fixed or unbiased sample returns very similar results to the one below.  This 
fixed or unbiased sample includes all firms for which a full set of data was available over the 
entire period of analysis. 
 
  N 10-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80-89 90-99 
Britain 1994 62 14% 15% 10% 15% 0% 14% 10% 12% 10% 
 1995 62 14% 15% 9% 14% 0% 17% 9% 10% 11% 
 1996 62 14% 13% 9% 14% 0% 19% 10% 11% 9% 
 1997 62 14% 15% 9% 10% 1% 19% 10% 12% 11% 
 1998 62 13% 16% 9% 14% 0% 18% 9% 12% 8% 
            
 Germany 1994 64 4% 19% 40% 12% 4% 7% 3% 2% 9% 
 1995 64 4% 20% 40% 11% 4% 8% 3% 2% 9% 
 1996 64 4% 20% 38% 12% 3% 9% 3% 2% 9% 
 1997 64 4% 20% 41% 11% 3% 7% 3% 2% 8% 
 1998 64 4% 19% 41% 11% 3% 7% 4% 2% 7% 
 
9  Certain inconsistencies exist, however, in the fixed sample for 1997 and 1998.  They can be 
explained with the absence of firms from the technology, media and telecom sector in this 
sample.  
10  Both, the current survey and the one carried out by Ansgar Richter had the sponsorship of 
the Financial Times.  
11  In Germany, for example, there are to date 13 firms in the DAX 100 that were not 
included in this index 15 month ago (31.12.1998).  Of those 13 firms, five were listed for a 
long period of time, one was listed in 1998, and the remaining 7 firms were listed after 1998.  
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In comparison to this, 23 firms in Britain entered the FTSE 100 during the last 15 months 
(including the latest reshuffle on the 17.03.2000).  One such firm (Emap), entered twice and 
left once.  Only three were not listed 15 months ago, of which one was a de-mutualised life 
insurer, the other two being from the Internet and Telecom sectors (which would have been 
listed on the Neuer Markt in Germany). 
12  A standard t-test was employed.  
13  This analysis does not include 1999 data as published accounts data was not fully available  
14  To ensure that the results are not distorted by minor activities, all contributions of sectors 
with less than 2% of overall turnover were excluded. 
15  In the strictest sense, the specialisation index is not a diversification index as it does not 
take into account the different businesses a firm is engaged in outside its core activity. 
16  å
=
-=
n
i
i
pD
1
2
1
, where pi is the share of a firm’s turnover in industry i. 
17  Very similar results are obtained using an unbiased or fixed sample over the same time 
period.  This fixed or unbiased sample includes all firms for which a full set of data was 
available over the entire period of analysis. 
 
 
 
Year N N-sector Special-
isation Index 
Berry's 
Diversification Index 
UK 1994 62 2.13 0.82 0.24 
 1995 62 2.00 0.84 0.22 
 1996 62 2.08 0.82 0.23 
 1997 62 2.10 0.82 0.24 
 1998 62 2.08 0.83 0.23 
      
Germany 1994 64 2.39 0.77 0.30 
 1995 64 2.39 0.79 0.28 
 1996 64 2.38 0.79 0.28 
 1997 64 2.33 0.78 0.29 
 1998 64 2.34 0.78 0.29 
 
18  As respondents could give multiple answers, the figures do not sum to 100%. 
19  As shown in Chapter 3 of this thesis only 38 demergers occurred in Europe over the last 
decade.  The numbers are therefore very low compared with the number of divestitures over 
the same period. 
20  This question was structured as a multiple-response question.  Therefore, the probabilities 
add up to more than 100%. 
21  The share of turnover is a crude proxy as it ignores ventures that are not directly sales 
related, for example like R&D or support functions of a firm. 
 
 54 
 
22  Given that firms in both countries face similar regulatory circumstances both within and 
outside the European Union. 
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